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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

THE STATE OP UTAH,

:

v.
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ARGUMENT1
POINT. MR. PERRY'S DUE PROCESS RIGHT TO PRESENCE AT THE
PROBATION EVIDENTARY HEARING DOES NOT HINGE ON WHETHER
THE STATE BELIEVES HIS PRESENCE WOULD BE USEFUL. THE RECORD
DEMONSTRATES THAT THERE WAS NOT AN EFFECTIVE WAIVER OF
THE RIGHT TO PRESENCE AT THE PROBATION HEARING AND
THEREFORE MR. PERRY'S DUE PROCESS RIGHT WAS VIOLATED.
A defendant's right to his day in court is not contingent on whether the State
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outcome of such a remand might be preordained"), do the contrary, "a day in court
means," at a minimum, that a "party shall be afforded the opportunity to present claims
ai id defenses, ai id 1 la ;e 1 1 i :M i i pi ;: pei ly adji idical ed oi i tl i 21 i iei its accordii ig to the facts and

the law." Miller v. USAA Cas. Ins. Co., 2002 UT 6,1142, 44 P.3d 663 (internal footnote
omitted); see Christiansen v. Harris, 163 P.2d 314, 316 (Utah 1945) (explaining that due
process guarantees a party "shall have the right to a hearing before a competent court,
with the privilege of being heard and introducing evidence to establish his cause or his
defense, after which comes judgment upon the record thus made"), overruled on other
grounds by Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
Absent from the probation statute and applicable case law is any caveat that a
probationer's due process right to be present, present evidence, and speak in his own
behalf at a probation evidentiary hearing is contingent on whether the state believes it
would be useless or not. In fact, cases cited by the state as contravening a defendant's
due process right actually support rather than limit the right to be present during a
probation evidentiary hearing and defend in person. See Appellee Brief 9-11, 15;
Kentucky v. Stincer, 482 U.S 730 (1987); Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97 (1934).
A defendant's right to presence is "assumed" when "[i]t bears, or may fairly be assumed
to bear, a relation, reasonably substantial, to his opportunity to defend." Snyder, 291 U.S.
at 106 (determining "Fourteenth Amendment does not assure a defendant the privilege to
be present at [inspection of scene of offensej at the same time as the jury "where nothing
is said by anyone to direct the attention of the jury to one feature or another."). "[A]
defendant is guaranteed the right to be present at any stage of the criminal proceeding
that is critical to its outcome if his presence would contribute to the fairness of the
procedure." Stincer, 482 U.S. at 745 (defendant's due process right not violated by
2

exclusion from victim's competency hearing where "[n]o question regarding the
substantive testimony that the two girls would have given during trial was asked at that
hearing").
Where the probation statute and applicable case law mandate that a trial court
"hold a hearing in order to extend, modify, or revoke probation, unless that right is
waived," in order to find that a probationer has violated the terms of probation, due
process assures a defendant's right to presence no matter how futile the State may deem
the hearing. State .v Orr, 2005 UT 92, ^16, 127 P.3d 1213 (citing Utah Code Ann. §7718-l(12)(a)). 'The hallmarks of due process are notice and an opportunity to be heard."
Utah County v. Ivie, 2006 UT 33,1J22, 137 P.3d 797 (citation omitted). The supreme
court has said Utah's due process clause "guarantee[s] that litigants will have their 'day
in court/" Duke v. Graham, 2007 UT 31, ^|23, 158 P.3d 540 (citation omitted); see
Bailey v. Bayles, 2002 UT 58,1J11 n.2, 52 P.3d 1158 ("Wrapped up in the bundle of
procedural rights associated with a party's right to a 'day in court' is the fundamental
right of. . . notice and an opportunity to be heard in a meaningful way." (citation
omitted)); Miller, 2002 UT 6 at ^[41 (holding "due process clause, at the very least,
requires that every claimant 'be afforded his "day in court"" (citation omitted));
Christiansen, 163 P.2d at 316 ("Many attempts have been made to further define 'due
process' but they all resolve into the thought that a party shall have his day in court.");
Gitsch v. Wight, 211 P. 705, 706 (Utah 1922) ("That every person has a right to his day
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in court and an opportunity to be heard before he can be deprived of a justiciable right is
too elementary for discussion.").
In this case, absent a knowing and voluntary waiver, due process assured Mr.
Perry's right to appear in person and speak in his own behalf, cross-examine witnesses
and present evidence in mitigation that the violation did not warrant revocation. The
record adequately supports that such a waiver did not occur. As argued in Appellant's
Opening Brief, trial counsel did not inform the court that he had discussed the issue of
waiver with Mr. Perry, explained the benefits or consequences, and secured a knowing
and voluntary waiver from Mr. Perry. See Appellant Opening Brief 16-22. Rather, trial
counsel put on the record that he was waiving Mr. Perry's presence because "he [was] in
prison" and he did not "see that there [was] any reason to bring [Mr. Perry to court]." R.
204:31. Apparently aware of the significance of Mr. Perry's absence the trial court noted
to defense counsel that although he has "indicated [he] would be happy waiving his
appearance . . . if [Mr. Perry | objects at some later point" the court would need to be
informed. R. 204:33. Trial counsel responded "I guess so. I think that's the only thing
we can do. There's no reason to keep bringing him up here for something where he's
already in prison for." R. 204:33.
On August 22, 2007, the trial court received a letter from Mr. Perry informing it
that he objected to being denied his right to be present at the probation evidentiary
hearing and desiring to appeal the court's decision. R. 178-82. Mr. Perry's letter
objecting to the denial of his presence at the probation revocation hearing was received
4

by the court shortly after the revocation hearing where the court explicitly gave Mr. Perry
the opportunity to object and the letter was the first chance Mr. Perry had to make his
legal argument regarding his denial of due process. R. 204:33.
The record adequately demonstrates that there was not a knowing and voluntary
waiver from Mr. Perry of his due process right to be present at the probation evidentiary
hearing. The exchange between trial counsel and the court establishes that counsel had
not discussed the matter of waiver with Mr. Perry nor obtained a waiver of his presence.
In absence of such a waiver, trial counsel was ineffective for proceeding with the hearing.
Given the adequate record on appeal, remand for a rule 23B hearing was unnecessary.
Mr. Perry maintains that his incarceration on another conviction did not necessitate his
revocation of probation and had the right to present the trial court with such a defense.
The denial of Mr. Perry's right to do so was prejudicial and this Court should remand for
a new evidentiary hearing. See U.S. v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 659 (1984) ('There are, . . .,
circumstances that are so likely to prejudice the accused that the cost of litigating their
effect in a particular case is unjustified.).
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CONCLUSION
As more fully set forth in the Opening Brief, Appellant, Scott Lynwood Perry,
respectfully requests that this Court remand for a new evidentiary hearing to allow Mr.
Perry to speak in his own behalf and present mitigating evidence arguing against
revocation of his probation.
SUBMITTED this / £

day of August, 2008.

DEBRA M.NELSON
Attorney for Appellant
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